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ARCh 1986 markcd thc cud of the phas out of
interest rate ceilings on deposits, otherwise known as
Regulation Q The handwriting on the wall became
evident for Regulation 0, when the Monetary Contn’oi
Act (MUA) of 1980 established the Depository Institu-
tions Den’egulation Committee ID DC), whose main
duty was to phase out the regulation over a period of
six year’s.
The purpose ofthis article is to reviewléderal policy
on deposit interest rate ceilings over the 53 year’ssince
they first were imposed. The article describes the
objectives of Congress in establishing ceiling rates on
deposits, examines their effects on the I’mnancial sys-
tem and economic activity, and, finally, assesses the
effect that phasing them out has had ~n tile coniposi-
tion of deposit liabilities.
This analysis focuses on three distinct periods dirt’-
ing which Regulation 0, was administer-ed under dif-
ferent objectives. In thefirst period, 1933 through 1965,
the ceilings constrained the interest r’ates paid by
most commercial banks for only a few short intervals.
During most ofthe second penod, 1966 through 1979,
ceiling m’ates effectively constrained the t’ates paid by
commercial banks and thrifts on at least some catego-
ries of their deposit liabilities. During the third period,
1980 through 1986, the DIDC gradually phased out
Regulation (1 once again allowing market forces to
determine deposit interest rates.
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‘i’he Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 prohibited the
paynnent of interest on demand deposits and autho-
rized the Fedentl Reserve to set intem’est t’ate ceilings
on time and savings deposits paid by commercial
banks. One important congn’essional mibjective was to
encourage country banks to lend more in their local
communities rather than hold balances with lar-ger
banks in financial centers. Cm’itics of banking practices
charged that the lan’ge banks in fimiancial center’s used
these funds for speculative purposes, thus depriving
businesses and individuals in smaller communities of
credit that could have been used productively.’
Supporters ofthe pn’ohibition of inten’est on demand
deposits also expressed concen’n that inten’hank hal—
‘The Banking Act of 1933 established controls over deposit interest
rates tom commercial banks lhat were members of lhe Federal
Reserve System. Nonmember commercial banks became subject
to the same controls in the Banking Act of 1935. Mutual savings
banks and savings and loan associations were exempt from the
ceiling interest rates on deposits until the fall of 1966. Reasons for
congressionally established interest rate ceilings in the 1930s ane
discussed in Cox (1966), pp. 1—30, House Committee on Banking
and Currency (1966a), pp. 651—53, Links (1966), and Haywood and
Linke (1968).
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ances were advemsely affecting the liquidity of the
banking system. When smaller banks had an outflow
of reserves, because of seasonal patterns in deposits
and loan demand or occasional financial panics, they
withdrew their deposits from their large correspon-
dent banks in thefinancial centers.These withdrawals
made it morn difficultfor the large correspondents to
meet the cash demands of their’ nonbank customers.
In its n’ole as lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve
had been established in 1914 to deal with these liquid-
ity problems. In the 1930s, however’, Congress still
believed that interbank balances created liquidity
problems for the banking system.
Another objective of ceiling interest rates on de-
posits was to increase bank profits by limiting the
competition for’ deposits. Congm’ess felt that competi-
tion for’ deposits not only reduced bank profits by
n’aising imiterest expenses, but also might cause banks
to acquin’e riskier’ assets with higher’ expected retui-ns
in attempts to limit the erosion of their pn~ofits.2
Bank pm’otests about the cost of federal deposit in-
sum-ance premiums provided a final justification for
interest rate ceilings. Sotne members of Congr’ess be-
lieved that the savings in interest expense resulting
from interest rate ceilings on deposits would exceed
the deposit insurance premiums.
Some of the objectives mentioned above are based
on the belief that banks’ profits could be increased by
imposing ceiling rates on deposits. l’he effects ofthese
ceilings on bank profits are not as obvious as their
effects on incentives to hold demand deposits.
Figure 1, which is used to illustrate the effects of
ceiling rates on bank profits, depicts the supply and
demand for loans and deposits in the banking system.
To simplily the presentation, the dollar amount of
loans is assumed to equal the amount of deposits at
each level of deposits? The solid line is the demand
curve for loans from the banking system. The dashed
line labeled D,r is the demand curve for deposits. The
demand for deposits is based on the demand for
loans. For each dollar amount ofloans demanded, the
interest rate that banks am willing to pay on deposits
is somewhat less than the interest rate they can re-
ceiveon loans; the difference determines bank profits.
The banking system is assumed to be competitive. The
profits are just large enough to yield a r’ate ofr’eturn on
the capital of the banking system comparable to re-
turns on equity in other industries with similar risk.4
The other dashed line, labeled S4, is the supply curve
ofdeposits to banks; it indicates the interest rates that
banks must pay to attract various dollar’ amounts of
deposits.
With no interest i-ate controls, banks will pay the




















tmBenston (1964) and Cox (1966) develop evidence from bank data
for the 1920s and 1930s that is not consistent with the view that
competition for deposits contributedto bankfailures.
3The capital of the banking system is assumed to equal the non-
interest-bearing reserves of banksplus the value of their physical
investmerlt in banking offices. Banks are assumed to maintain a
constant ratio of capital to deposits. When deposits change, banks
change their reserves and the value of their offices by the same
percentageas the percentagechange in theirdeposits. It deposits
decline, banks reduce their loans by the same dollar amount and
reducecapital by making aspecial dividend paymenttotheirshare-
holders. If deposits rise, the shareholders make additional invest-
ments in the bankto raisecapital.
4The spreadbetween the demand curve for loans andthe demand
curve for deposits is wider at higher levels of interest rates. This
feature of the curves in figure 1 reflects the fact thatthe return on
capital of the banknecessary to attracttheinvestmentofthe bank’s
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Ii Central reserve city banks in New York city.
The level of deposits and loans will equal h),. The
profits of the banking system equal ABCh). Suppose
the government considem’s these profits to be too small
forasafe and sound banking system and sets aceiling
interest rate on the deposits of OE that is below the
tate OA that banks would pay with no ceiling n-ate in
effect. With that ceiling rate, the quantity of deposits
that banks can attract falls to I),. With a lowem’ level of
deposits to lend, the interest i-ate on loans rises to OH.
The profits of the banking system shift front ABCD to
EFGLI.
Imposing the ceiling interest rate on deposits does
not necessarily increase the pr-ofits of the banking
system. The difference between prolits with the ceil-
ing rate in effect and profits with no ceiling rate de-
pends on the shapes of the demand curve for loans
fD3 and the supply curve of deposits (5,,). Comigr’ess
assumed implicitly that theslopes of these two curves
wer’e sufficiently steel) that the banking system’s











One majom’ reason thr inter’est ceilings on demand
deposits was to reduce the incentives for relatively
small banks lo hold deposits with larger banks in the
major financial centers. Small commer’cial banks,
however’, did not reduce the share of their’ assets held
as deposits with other banks, but instead increased
that share from about 5 percent in 1932 to about 17
percent by 1941 chart 1). As another indicator’ of this
‘A more thorough examination of the effects ol deposit rate ceilings
on bank profitswould incorporate the effects ofnon-interestcompe-
tition. Profits would be reduced if banks respond to ceilings that
restrain theinterest ratestheypay on deposits through non-interest
expenditures. The implications of non-interest competition for de-
posits are consideredin the section below thatexamines the effects
of Regulation 0 policy in the period 1966 through 1979.
Percentage
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except the overage rate paid on time and savings deposits which is an annual series.
trend, the ratio of interbank deposits to total deposit
liabilities roseat central reserve city banks from about
17 percent in 1932 to about 24 percent by 1941. The
increase in each ratio reflected the desire of banks to
keep alarger proportion of their assets in liquid form
after the banking crises of the early 1930s. What’s
more, the opportunity cost of holding interbank de-
mand deposits was relatively low in 1933. as it was
throughout the rest of the 1930s. In the years 1933
through 1939, the yield on newly issued Treasury bills
averaged only 22 basis points.
On November 1, 1933, the Federal Reserve set the
ceiling interest rate on all time and savings deposits at
3 percent (chart 2). The average interest rate that
member banks paid on time deposits was 2.8 percent
in 1932 and 2.6 percent in 1933. The ceiling rate of 3
percent, therefore, was above the rate that banks had
been paying on time deposits shortly before it was
imposed. tn 1934, the first full year for’ member banks
under Regulation Q the average interest rate paid by
member banks on time deposits was 2.4 percent.
Thus, most member bank deposits did not yield the
ceiling rate of 3 percent that year. ‘I’heyield on short-
term Treasury securities was below 1 percent, while
the yield on 4-to-fl month commercial paper was 1.25
percent in November 1933. Thus, this imtial ceiling
rate on time and savings deposits was above both the
rates being paid by member banks and short-term
market rates.
‘rheceiling rate on all timeand savings deposits was
lowered to 2.5 percent on Febr’uaty 1, 1935. The aver-
age interest rate paid by member banks on time de-
posits in 1935 was 1.9 percent, while most short-term
market interest rates were under 1 percent.








These early observations indicate that the Federalr6ossmLREsssvt~sAuKc*st.Louts 968.9959’? 1986
Reserve interpreted its mandate for administering
Regulation Q to restrain the especially aggressive
banks from offering such high interest rates on de-
posits that they would get into financial trouble.” It
does not appear that the Federal Reserve pursued the
policy, analyzed above, of attempting to increase the
profits ofthe banking system by setting deposit ceiling
ratesbelowthe rates that most banks would have paid
with no ceilings in effect.
From the nud-1930s to the mid-1960s, the ceiling
rates on time and savings deposits generally were
above market interest rates and above the aver-age
interest rates paid on time and savings deposits by
member- banks. In 1957 and 1962, when market intei—
est rates rose near’ or’ above theceiling rates on savings
deposits, these ceilings were raised (see chart 3 on
page 29). Thus, for the first 30 or so years of their
existence, ceiling interest rates on time and savings
deposits were above interest rates on Treasury securi-
ties in all but a few months, and the average interest
rates paid by member banks on all time and savings
deposits were below the lowest ceiling rate in effect,




Regulation Q policy was changed in 1966, when
interest rate ceilings were imposed on thrift institu-
tions (mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations). In contrast to the earlier period exam-
ined above, 1966 began a period of ceiling rates on at
least some categories of time and savings deposits at
commercial banks that were kept below Tr-easury bill
rates.
The change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 reflected
the dissatisfaction of policymakers with the perfor-
mance ofthe financial system. Interest r’ateshad rsen
sham-ply in 1965 and 1966. The three-month Treasury
bill rate had r-isen from 3.84 pem’cent in September1965
to 5.37 percent in September 1966. Over- that period,
interest rates on residential mortgage loans had risen
from 5.80 percent to 6.65 percent.
Pohicymakers became more and more comicemned
about the allocation of credit. In 1966 the volume of
funds n’aised bybusiness fir’ms in thefinancial mar’kets
rose sharply relative tothe funds raised by households
in the form of residential mortgages. The slowing in
the rate ofincrease in residential mortgage credit was
especially pronounced at thrift institutions?
The changes in Regulation Q ceiling r-ates metlected
policymakers’ interpretation of these events. Sup-
por’ters oflegislation that changed Regulation Qpolicy
considered the conipetition for deposits between
commer’cial banks and thrifts one of the primary
causes of the general rise in interest rates. They am-
gued that deposit inter’est r-ate ceilings must be ex-
tended to thrifts to limit this rise.
Supporters of the legislation also thought that the
diversion ofcredit from residential mor-tgages to credit
for business firms could be rever’sed by limiting the
interest rates that commercial banks could pay on
deposits. Since commercial banks wer’e considered
thethrifts’ primary competitors in attm’actingdeposits,
thrifts could make mom-c mortgage credit available at
lower interest rates if they were shielded from such
competition.
In the fall of 1966, interest rate ceilings on deposits
were set slightly higher at thrifts than at commercial
banks. Higher ceiling rates at thrifts were intended to
induce depositor’s at commercial banks to shift their’
deposit accounts to thrift institutions. Policymakers
assumed that thrifts then would increase the amount
ofmortgage credit available to homebuyers and lower
their- mortgage interest rates.” ‘This policy initially was
described as a temporary one to deal with unusual
circumstances. Over’time, however’, many in the thrift
institution industry came to view the new Regulation
Qpolicy as essential for them to attr’act deposits and
make mortgage loans.”
Figur-e 2 illustr-ates the supply and demand for- de-
posits at commercial banks and thrift institutions.
This analysis has two purposes: first, to model the
effects ofRegulation Qpolicy anticipated by policyma-
kers, and second) to illustrate why this policy did not
yield the anticipated results.
‘See testimony in House Committee on Banking and Currency
(196Gb) and SenateCommittee on Banking and Currency (1966).
“Savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks, which
specialize in residential mortgage lending, are identified as thrift
institutions.
“For astatement by agovemment policymaker thatdefendsRegula-
tion 0 as a means of promoting the flow of credit to residential
mortgages, see Martin (1970). “Ruebling (1970).Figure 2
Effects of Ceiling Interest Rates on the Deposits of Commercial Banks and Thrift Institutions
Interest
rates
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Some of the assumptions underlying figure 1 are
also employed in constructing figure 2: For commer-
cial banks and thrifts, deposits are assumed to equal
loans. The spread between the demand curve for
loans and that for deposits represents the competitive
return on capital. To depositors, commercial banks
and thrifts are close, but not perfect, substitutes. If, fijr
instance, commercial banks increase the interest rate
they offer on deposits relative to the rate offered by
thrifts, some, but not all, depositors will shift their
accounts from thrifts to commercial banks. This inter-
action is modeled in figure 2 by making the position of
the supply curve forone kind of institution depend on
the interest rate paid bythe other kind. Forinstance, if
commer’cial banks increase the interest rate they offer
on deposits lr,,), thesupply curve of deposits to thrifts
will shift to the left.
Thrift institutions are assumed to specialize in
mor-tgage lending, while commercial banks specialize
in business and consumer lending. Given this speciali-
zation, the demand curve of loans from each type of
institution is assumed to be independent of the inter-
est rate that the other type of institution char-ges for
loans.
Suppose, initially, that thrifts pay a slightly higher
interest rate on deposits than commercial banks, i.e.,
thatr~. exceeds r~, andthe rate r~ equals the ceiling r-ate
on deposits at comnmereial banks.” In the initial equi-
librium, the demand for loans at each type ofinstitu-
tion is labeled D~and the demand for deposits is
labeled D~ theinitial level ofdeposits and loans is ~ at
commercial banks and T0atthrifts; and the initial mates
charged on loans are c,, (banks) and m0 (thr-ifts).
Now, suppose that the demand for loans at both
commercial banks and thrifts increases, m-epresented
by shifts in the demand curves from lJ~to DL. The
demand curves fordeposits shift up to D~, maintaining
the same spreads between the demand curves for
loans and those for- deposits at each level of interest
rates.
Policymaker’s must either raise the ceiling rate on
deposits at conimercial banks in response to the rise
in the demand for credit or keep the ceiling rate at r~.
Given the nature of Regulation Q policy prior to 1966,
the ceiling r’ate on bank deposits would have been
raised enough to avoid constraining the ability of
commer’cial banks to compete for deposits. In 1966, in
“’This suppositiondescribes what actuallyoccurred before late 1966;
thrifts, did, in tact, pay higher interest rates on deposits than com-













80 T0T1contrast, policymakers decided to keep the ceiling
rates at levels that would limit the rates that banks
could pay on deposits and impose similar- ones on
thrifts. The objectives of the new policy can be illus-
tr’ated by comparing the effects of the increase in
credit demand with and without the binding ceiling
rates on deposits.
First, consider the case in which the ceiling r’ate is
raised enough to place no constraint on the rates paid
by commercial banks and no ceiling rate is imposed
on thrifts. The effect ofthe increase in the demand for
credit on the rates paid on deposits canbe analyzed as
a series of interactions between the rates paid by
commercial banks and those paid by thrifts. With
thrifts initially paying the rate ri on deposits, the rate
paid by commercial banks rises to r,.With commercial
banks paying the rate r~,the supply curve of deposits
at thrifts shifts to the left (to S(r~)).The rise in the
demand forloans at thrifts and the rise in the interest
rate paid on deposits by commercial banks create an
excess demand for deposits at thrifts. In response, the
rate they offer to payon deposits rises to r... The next
step in the adjustment of deposit rates to the rise in
the demand for credit involves a shift in the supply
curve of deposits at commercial banks to the left
(S(r4i), causing the rate paid by commercial banks to
rise to r~.
Statements by the policymakers who advocated the
change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 indicate that,
after observing such interactions between the rates
paid by commercial banks and thrifts, they concluded
that interest rates were being driven higher by the
competition. The increases in interest rates paid on
deposits, in fact, represented the response by deposi-
tory institutions to increases in the demand for credit.
The solution to the escalation of interest rates
adopted by Congress was to impose ceilings on the
deposit ratespaid by thrifts and to set the ceiling rates
for commercial banks and thrifts below the rates they
would payin the absence of ceilings. The ceiling rates
were set slightly higher at thrifts to induce an inflow of
deposits from commercial banks to thrifts, which
would be used to make residential mortgage loans.
To illustrate how policymakers assumed this policy
would work, sirppose the ceiling rate for commercial
banks is rg and for thrifts is r-i~.Preventing an incr’ease
in deposit interest rates at banks and thrifts is sup-
posed to keep the supply curves for deposits in their
initial positions before the rise in the demand for
cr’edit (S(r-~) for- comnrnem-cial banks and S(r~( for thrifts).
Imposing the ceiling ratesr~ and r~. does pr’event arise
in the interest expense of depository institutions after
the rise in the demand for credit.
Figure 2 also illustrates, however, why the ceiling
interest rateson deposits would not prevent increases
in interest rates on loans charged by banks and thrifts.
Suppose that after the rise in the demand for credit,
thedeposits andloans ofbanksare still B,, (yielding the
ceiling rate r~) and the deposits and loans ofthrifts are
T0 (yielding riJ. The interest rate charged by commer—
cial banks on their commercial and consumer loans
rises from c,, to c, due to the rise in the demand for
credit; theinterest i-atecharged by thrifts on mortgage
loans rises from m0 to m,.
It is not possible to draw ageneral conclusion about
whether the mortgage interest rate would have been
higher with no controls on the interest rates paid on
deposits orwith the ceiling ratesr~ and rIin effect. The
difference in the mortgage interest rate under these
conditions depends on how responsive the supply of
deposits at each type of institution is to the interest
rate paid on deposits by the other type ofinstitution.”
Additional influences on the supply of mortgage
credit by thrift institutions analyzed in the following
section, which policymakers seem to have ignored,
would strengthen the argument that the Regulation Q
policy adopted in 1966 reduced the supply of mort-
gage credit by thrifts and r-aised mortgage interest
rates.
The change in Regulation Q policy in 1966 had the
dual purpose ofhalting the escalation ofinterest rates
paid on deposits and stimulating the expansion of
mortgage credit. The fact that these objectives were
inconsistent can be illustrated by referring again to
figure 2. If the primary objective was to stimulate
thrifts to make more mortgage loans, policymakers
should have set the ceiling rate on bank deposits low
enough toconstrain the rate paid by banks, but should
not have put ceilings on the inter-est rates paid by
thrifts. With the ceiling r’ate on bank deposits of r, the
deposits and loans of thrifts would have been higher
(1’,) and the interest rate on mortgage loans lower if
thrifts had not been constrained by the ceiling rates
on their deposits.
“To illustratethe basis for this conclusion, suppose that the supply
curve ofdeposits at thrifts does not shift when there is a change in
theinterest rate paid on deposits by commercial banks; instead,that
supply curve remains in the initial position of S(rg). Under that
assumption, the mortgage interest rate would bebelow m, with no
ceiling interest rates on deposits after the rise in the demand for
credit. In contrast, the farther the supply curve of deposits at thrifts
shiftstothe leftfor agiven risein theinterestrate paidon deposits by
commercial banks, the more likely it is thatthe mortgage rate would
be higher under the condition of no interest rate controls on de-
posits.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SI, LOUIS FEBRUARY 1986
Chart 3
Interest Rates and the Ceiling Rates on Time and Savings Deposits
0
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which is an annual series.
Ceiling rates on sonic categories of deposits were
kept belowthe market rates oil Treasury securities for-
most of theperiod fr-om the fall of1966 through Mar-ch
1986 (chart 3). This policy did not isolate thrift institu-
tions and the nrar’ket for r-esidential mor-tgages from
the effects of fluctuations iii mar’ket interest rates.
When market interest rates rose relative to the ceiling
rates, the growth ofdeposits atthrifts slowed.” Fluclu-
ations in the growth of deposits at thrifts may have
contributed to the abrupt changes in the pace of
residential construction activrty; some studies, how-
ever, do not support the hypothesis that disinterme-
diation at thm-ifts adversely affected residential con-
struction.’3 Thus, the policy of imposing binding
ceilings on deposit interest rates pr-oduced results
that were inconsistent with the policy’s stated goals.
There was ariother effect. Regulation Q policy al-
tered the distribution of wealth in the economy. De-
posit interest rate ceilings disci-irninated against the
relatively less wealthy savers.’4 When market interest
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NOTE: All data are quarterly except the overage rote paid on time and savings deposits
j~ After 197], the average interest rate is for all insured commercial banks.
‘3Jaftee and Rosen(1979) and Berkman (1979). The results ofsome
studies, however, do not support the view that changes in the
availability of mortgage credit through thrift institutions iniluence
residential construction. See Arcelus and Mettzer (1973), Meltzer
(1974), and DeRosa (1978).
‘4Kane (1970, 1980), Clatfelter and Lieberman(1978), and Lawrence
and Eltiehausen (1981). ‘McKelvey (1978).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK Of ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1988
tors shifted their deposits to money market securities.
Moreover, deposits in denominations of $100,000 or
more were made exempt from Regulation Q in June
1970. Investors without enough funds to buy money
market instruments continued to hold their funds at
commercial banks and thrifts in accounts subject to
Regulation Q ceiling rates. According to some studies,
small savers lost several billion dollars in interest
ear-mngs as ar-esult of Regulation Q ceilings.~
The reasons for the failure of Regulation Q policy to
achieve the objectives established in 1966 can be ana-
lyzed by examining figure 2. Setting the ceiling rate
that banks could pay on deposits atr~ did not guaran-
tee that thrifts could attract deposits of T,, by paying
the rate r~.Banks could attract additional deposits
through various forms of non-interest expenditures.
When interest rate ceilings on deposits werebelow the
r-atesthat banks would have offeredwith no ceilings in
effect, banks competed fordeposits by offering deposi-
tors a variety ofgifts, free” services, and new offices
that were more conveniently located.’ These forms of
non-interest competition shifted the supply curve of
deposits at thrifts to the left of the line labeled S(r~).
With the ceiling on thrift deposit rates at r’1~,a shift in
the supply curve of deposits to the left reduces the
level of deposits and loans at thrifts and drives up the
interest rate on mortgages. The various forms of non-
interest competition for- deposits by thrifts would also
causethe supply curveof deposits for banks to shift to
the left.
Thus far, we have not indicated how inter-est r-ates
other than those paid on the deposits of banks and
thrifts influence the supply of deposits. When interest
rates on securities such as Tr-easury bills rose above
the ceiling rates on deposits at banks and thrifts, the
growth of time and savings deposits declined at both
types of institutions.’7 This effect can be illustr’ated by
referring to figure 2. Suppose the market interest rate
on Treasury bills rises when the demand for credit
rises at banks and thrifts. The rise in the Treasury bill
rate shifts the supply curves of deposits to the left at
both types ofinstitutions. With ceiling ratesr~ and r~ in
effect, banks and thrifts can not respond directly by
raising the interest rates they pay on deposits. As a
‘5Morgan (1979), Pyle (1974, 1978), and Taggart (1978).
~sWhite(1976). Taggart (1978), Speliman (1980), Kilcollin and
Hanweck(1981), Peterson (1981), andStartz (1983).
‘~See Gilbertand Lovati (1979).
result, deposits at both banks arid thrifts falland cause
the inter-est r-ates on their loans to rise mor-e than if
they had been free to raise the interest rates they pay
on deposits.
The problems caused by interest rate ceilings be-
came more serious in the late 1970s when market
inter-est rates r’ose sharply (char-t 3). In response, the
regulators ofdepository institutions took limited steps
to lift ceilings on some categories of time and savings
deposits in denominations of $100,000 or- less.
The relaxation ofceiling interest rates on deposits in
the late 1970s is shown in table 1. Money mar-ket
certificates (MMCs), authorized in June 1978, had in-
terest rate ceilings that floated with the yield on 6-
month Treasury bills. Terms on MMCs incorporated
two features of Regulation Q policy in effect befor-e
June 1978: the ceiling rate for thr-ifts each week was 25
basis points higher than that at commercial banks,
and, with a minimum denomination of $10,000, the
authorization of MMCs benefited only wealthy
investors.
Another change in 1978 was the authorization of
automatic transfer service accounts at commer-cial
banks, the fit-st move at the national level toward the
authorrzation of interest-bearing checkable deposits.
Finally, small savercertificates SSCs) were authorized
in July 1979,with ceiling rates that floated with market
interest rates; there was no minimum denonunation
on SSCs but aminimum initial maturity of 30 months.
Sharp increases in interest rates in late 1979 and
early 1980, combined with Regulation Q ceiling rates
chart 3), induced large outflows of small-
denomination deposits from banks arid thrifts. Money
market mutual ftrnds had become major competitors
with depository institutions for small-denomination
investment accounts, arid investments in money mar-
ket mutual funds grew rapidly during 1979 arid ear-ly
1980 (chart 41. Realizing that Regulation Q was not
yielding the desired results of restraining competition
for deposits or- incr-easing the supply of mortgage
cr-edit, Congress responded by passing the MCA in
Marcli 1980, which established a procedure for phas-
ing out Regulation Q.
One ofthe most significant sections of the MCA callsTable 1
Steps in the Phase-Out of Regulation 0
Effectivedate
of change Nature of change
June 1, 1918 MMCs established, with rn:nirnurn dc-nomination of$10,000 and matUrities of 26 weeks Ihe floating ceiling rates
for eachweek wereset at tIm discountyield ansix-month Treasury hills atS&Ls and MSHs. 25 basis paintsless at
~8s
November 1 1978 CBs authorized to offer A IS accounts. allowing funds to be transferred automatically tram savings to checking
accounts as rni-eded to ,fvu.d overdrafts Ihe ceilinq rate on ATS accnurits was set at 5.25 percent.the same as
the ceiling rareo’r regular savir;gs accounts ~l CBs
Joy 1 19/9 SSCs established with re miritmum denommnat’on, maturity of30 monthsorrriore and floating ceiling rates based
on theyield orr 2 1 2-year I nc-usury securities but 25 basis pants higher at S&I sarid MSBs. Maximums at 11. Ia
percentat CBs mind 12 percent atS&L.s and MSBs
June 2. 1980 Ihefloating ceiling rates on SS~sraised 50 basis points relative to the yieldon? I 2 year Treasury securitiesat
S&t s and MSBs arid at CBs. The ‘naxirnurn ccil’ria rates set in June 1979 were retained
June 5 1980 New floating ceilnq rates on MMUs All depositary institutions may pay the discount yield on b-month Treasury
bills plus 25 basis purnts when mc- bill rate is 8./S percent or higher the ceiling rate will be no :nwer than /.75
percent. A ‘ate drfferc’nitil4r of up to 25 has’s pointsfavors S&Ls and MSBs if the bill rate isbetween I lb percent
and 8.75 percent.
December31. 1980 NOW accounts permitted nationwioe atall depository institutions.~eilintj rates on NOW and ATS accoLint~ set a;
5 25 percent
August 1 1981 Caps an SS~so’lt /5 percent at CBs and 12 percent at S&Ls and MSF3s eliminated Ceilingrates float with the
yield on 2 I 2 year Ireasury securities
October] 1981 Adopted ru’es for the Al Savers Certiticates specrfied ri the Economic Recovery Act of 1981
November 1. 1981 Froating ceiting rates on MMGs eachweek changedto the higher ofthe 6-month Treasury billrate in the previous
week orthe average over the previous fourweeks.
December 1, I 981 New category of IRA Keogh accounts created with rnnmmum maturity of 1 -t 2 ycars. rio regulated rnterest rate
ceiing ano no minimum denomination.
May 1, 1982 New tirrie deposit c’eateo with no interest rate ceikng. no niinimnum deriom~nation and an initial minimum maturity
of 3-I.?years.
New short—term deposit instrumn nt created with $7 aDO mrnimum deniominatorrarid 91 daym’itunty The floatrng
ceiling rate :s equat to the discount yield on 91-day1 reasury bills for S&Ls and MSBs. 25 basis points less for
CBs
Maturity r,inge of SS~s ad;usted to 30-42 months
September 1 1982 Ncw deposit account created witria minimum denomination of520.000 and maturity of /to 31 days I he float.ng
ceiling rate ‘s equal to the discount yield on 91 day Treasury bills ton SM s arid MSBs, 25 basis points less br
CBs ftiese cong rates are susperrdeo mt the 91 thy Treasurybill rate fa’ls below 9percent fortour cOnsecut,ve
Ireasury bnil auctions
Decemhcr 14 1 g82 MMDAs authorized with niiriimum balance ofnot less than 52.500. no intcrest cening no minimum maturity, up to
s’x transfers per month (rio more than three by craft), and unlimitecr wrthdrawaisby mail. messenger or tn person
January 5. 1983 Super NOW accounts authorized with same features as the MMDAs. except that unlimited tranisf mrs we
permitted.
Interest rate ceiling e:mminated and m nimum dennrriination reouced to $2,500 on 7- to 31-day ac:rournts
Minimum denommnatinn reducedto 32 500 on 91-day accounts and MMCs of less than $100 000
Apr.i t . 1983 Mimurnurn maturity on SSCs reduced to 18 months
October 1. 1983 All interest rate ceilings eliminated except those on pas~hooKsavings arid regular NOW accoLints Mir:imnUJm
denorn:nation of 57.500 established or time deposits with maturities of 31 days or less (below thms minimum,
oassbook sav-ngs ratesapply)
January 1. 1984 Hate diftureriniat between commercmal banks ana thrills on passbook savings accounts and /t o 31 thy time
deposits of less ftran $2,500 c’lrrninatc-d Ail depository .nstitctrons may pay a rnnaximumo~ 5 50 percent
January 1. 1981) Minimum denominations on MMDAs Super NOWs and 7-to 31-oay ceiling freetime dcposits reduced to $1 000
January 1. 1986 Minimum denominations on MMDAr. Super NOWs rrid 7-to 31-day cei’nq tree time deposits elimiriamed
March 31. 1986 All interest rateceilings ei:miriaten except or ttru requirerrientthat no interest he paid on demand ouposits.
I errris:
S&L~ savings and loan associatmons SSCs sma” saver centi’icafc’s
MSBs mutua savings eaniks Al S accounts autonlatmc transfer ‘c’nvice accounts
CBs - comrrmeicia: banks ~ acceunts -- negotiahe order of withdrawal accounts
MMCs money market certitcates MMDAs money market deposit accountsFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1986
Chart 4
Small Time and Savings Deposits at all Depository Institutions
and Investments in MMMFs
Ratio scale Ratio scale














1971 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 1985
NOTE Savings deposits inctode money market deposits accounts. Investments in money market mutual funds are the
porpose and broker/dealer funds.
forthe elimination of ceilings on deposit interest rates return on theirsavings as soon as it iseconomically
over a six-year period. The statement of findings and feasible for depositony institutions to pay such
put-pose in that section of the act reads as follows: m-ate.
The act did not establish a specific timetable for
‘the Congress hereby finds that eliminating deposit interest c-ate ceilings, but dde-
(1) limitations on the interest rates which are payable gated those decisions to a newly created committee:
on deposits and accounts discourage per-sons from the DIDC. Voting member-s of the IJIJJC included the
saving money, ct-care inequities Ion’ depositors, im- sectetary of the Treasury and chairpersons of the
perle the ability of depository institutions to comm Federal Reserve Board Federal Deposit fnsurance
pete for funds, and have not achieved their put’—
pose of providing an even flow of hinds for home
mortgage lending; and
(2) all depositors, and pan-ficulam-Iv those with modest
tm
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
savings, ar-c entitled to receive a market rate of (1980), title II, sec. 202 (a),Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and
National Credit Union Administration. The Comptrol—
let- of the Currency was a non-voting member- of the
DIDC -
The act directed the DIDC to provide for the otderly
phase-out of maximum interest r’atesthat may bepaid
on time and savings deposits as rapidly as economic
conditions wartarited. A primary consideration in de-
ter-mining when conditions warranted raising ordim-
mating these ceilings was the effect of such changes
on the safety and soundness of depository institu-
tions. ‘The act gave the DIDC broad discretion in
choosing a method for phasing out the ceiling r-ates.
One limitation was that the DIDC could not raise
interest rate ceilings on all deposit categoiies above
market interest rates before March 1988.
L.IHL.:.%S1.JNC. (}LJIP ~~~.~‘(TFJ:AT.DJJN (7:
1.7)80 ~
Man: qi binu (lrnnn)n Nan inber 1(782
Sonicof the early actions ofthe DtDC were explicitly
dictated by Congress. These were the establishment of
nationwide NOWaccounts, available in Januaty 1981,
and All Saver-s Certificates, available in Octobei 1981.”
Of the eam-ly changes made at the discr-etion of the
DIIJC, the most significant involved raising or elimi-
nating ceiling rates on categories of deposit liabilities
with rather long maburities.’°Fon instance, the DtIJC’s
first action was to increase by 50 basis points the
floating ceiling rates on time deposits with maturities
of at least 30 months, effective in June 1980. Actions
effective in August 1981,December 1981 and May 1982
involved raising or elinunating ceiling rates on small
time deposit accounts with initial maturities of 18
months or longer.
In contrast, there were relatively minor changes in
the ceiling rates on short—term deposits. The only
changes in the ceiling rates on MMCs, lot’ instance,
were the minor adjustments in June 1980 and Novem-
ber’ 1981 (table 1). The new categories of short-term
‘
5
AIl Savers Certificates were anew categoryof deposits availableat
commercial banks and thrifts with a floating ceiling rateequal to 70
percent of the yield on one-year Treasury bills. Interest on these
one-year certificates was exempt from federal income tax, up to
$1,000 ofinterest pertaxpayer.
20The DIDC took other typesof actions that are not listed in table 1.
Those other actions include restricting gifts by depository institu-
tionsto depositorsand adjostiog thepenaltiesforearly withdrawalof
deposits.
deposits authorized in May and September of 1982
had relatively high minimum denominations.
Drr-nnnrr
Depository institutions complained to Congress
that the DtDC was not moving fast enough to allow
them to meet the competition from money market
mutual funds (MMMF5). The categor-ies of short-term
time deposits on which depository institutions could
pay rates close to market interest rates had minimum
denominations that were substantially higher than
the minimum investments required by MMMFs. tn-
vestments in MMMFs continued growing much faster
than small time aridsavings deposits after the passage
of the MCA in March 1980, a pattern that continued
until late 1982 (chart 4).
The Garn-St Ger’main Act of 1982 directed the IJIDC
to create acategory ofdeposits with terms that would
be directly equivalent to atid competitive with money
market mutual funds.” The DIDC i-esponded by au-
thorizitig money market deposit accounts (MMDAs),
available as of December 14, 1982, and Super NOW
accounts, available as of January 5, 1983. The DIDC
also specified a timetable for eliniinating the remain-
ing ceiling r-ates, as indicated in table 1. MMDAs and
Super NOW accounts were subject to minimum bal-
ance requirements until January 1, 1986. The only
remaining i-estciction on the interest rates paid on
deposits is the prohibition of interest payments on
demand deposits, which was not altered by the MCA.
Pbnr-r-~-On( ~
aI.t~.thnrn: on •tn.uin.nnnnn
~.: a a’ .~ .~
Depositor-sresponded to the steps taken in phasing
out Regulation Qby shif’ting their’ funds to accounts on
which they could receive higher returns. This is illus-
trated by the decline over-time in the m-atio ofsavings to
small time deposits at all depository institutions, since
the ceiling rates on small time deposits were raised
and eliminated, while the ceilings on savings deposits
changed little. Inthe thr-eeyears prior to the introduc-
tion of MMCs, 1975—77, savings deposits were about
115 per-cent of small time deposits. That ratio has
declined steadily since then, until, in 1985, savings
deposits were only about 33 percent of small time
deposits.
Other’ checkable deposits (the inten-est-bearing
2’Garcia (1983).AAV
checkable deposits that institutions may offerto indi-
viduals and nonprofit institutions) began growing rap-
idly after all depository institutions were permitted to
offer these accounts in January 1.981 (table 2). The
interest i-ate ceilings on other checkable deposits have
been the same for commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, and mutual savings banks since 1981.
Commercial banks accounted for- oven’ 81 percent of
other- checkable deposits in 1981, but their share has
declined by about 10 percentage points since then.
Commercial banks have increased their share of
small time deposits since 1980 (table 3). ‘I’he rising
share of small time deposits at commercial banks
reflects theeffect ofsever-al DIDCactions that removed
the advantages that the ceiling rates had given to thrift
institutions in competing for small time deposits. For
instance, thrifts lost their rate advantage on MMCs on
June 5, 1980. Several other DIDC actions put thrifts
and commercial banks on an equal footing in cornpet-
ing for various categor’ies of small time deposits.
The ceiling rate on savings deposits was 25 basis
points higher at thrift institutions than at commercial
banks throughout the period covered in table 3 until
January 1, 1984, when theceiling at commercial banks
was increased by 25 basis points. Despite the i-ate
disadvantage, the share of savings deposits at com-
mercial banks rose slightly in 1979 arid 1980. The
relatively large drop inthe share ofsavings deposits at
commercial banks after- 1982 appear’s to be related to
the success of commercial banks in attracting
MMDAs. Since MMDAs were authorized in December
1982, the share at commercial banks has been around
60 percent or higher. Some ofthefunds that went into
MMDAs at commercial banks carue out of their- own
savings deposit liabilities.
Column 4 of table 3 nets out the trends in the first
three columns. The share of small time and savings
deposits plus MMDAS at commercial banks has risen
steadily since 1979, the year before the DIDC began
removing the rate ceiling advantages of thrift institu-
tions. Halfofthese deposits were at commercial banks
in 1985, up from about 40 percent in 1979.
Thrift institutions accounted for about 8 percent of
the time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or
more in 1978. Astheir share ofdeposits in the smaller-
denomination categories declined, thrifts turned to
the market forlarge-denomination deposits to replace
the small accounts they lost to commercial banks. By
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pmjsits at ccso in ercial banks ha~ bi -en smnal li-i- than
he changes in the specific c;ttvgones. The share of
total time amid savings deposits at commercial banks
rose about 4 percentage points from 1978 through
1982 and has been approximately unchanged since
then. Since 1982, the funds that thrifts have r-aised by
incr-easing their large-denomination deposits have
been sufficient to offset their declining share of small-
denomination deposits. The reasons for these
changes are explained in the appendix.
The policy of setting interest i-ate ceilings on de-
posits did not achieve its intended objectives. The
original objectives in the 1930s, when ceiling rates
were first imposed on commercial banks, were to
induce relatively small banks to reduce their balances
due from other banks and to increase the profits ofthe
banking system by limiting the interest expense of
banks. Relatively small banks instead increased the
share of their assets held at other- banks during the
1930s. During the first 30 years under Regulation Q
ceiling rates on time and savings deposits were suf-
ficiently high to put no effective constraint on the
inter’est r-ates paid by most commercial banks. The
ceiling rates, however, may have constr-ained the
growth of the most aggressive banks.
Regulation Q policy adopted in 1966 failed to
achieve its objectives of constraining increases in in-
terest rates and promoting astable supply of mon’tgage
credit. As aside effect, the policy adopted in 1966 also
alter-ed the allocation of wealth in the economy, caus-
ing those with r’elatively small savings to forego bil- Changes in the share of total time and savings de-Table 3
Time and Savings Deposits at Commercial Banks As a
Percentage of Deposits at All Depository Institutions
II) (2~ (3~ t4) (5~ ~6)
Small time
Small and savings Large Total time
time Savings deposits time and savings
Period deposits deposits MMDAs plus MMDAs deposits deposits
1978 36.6% 44 6 -~ N A. 40 7% 92 0% 48.4%
1979 36.0 45.4 N A4 0 1 88.6 48.2
1980 38.6 46.2 NA 41 4 834 48.9
1981 40.9 461 NA 425 82.6 50.5
1982 43.8 46.0 60.9% 444 81.3 52.2
1983 447 44.1 590 480 740 57.7
1984 44.3 42.8 623 487 65 1 52.0
1985 43/ 415 646 50.7 63.5 523
lions of dollars in interest income they might other-
wise have earned.
Congress acted in 1980 to establish a process for
phasing out Regulation Qbecause it observed that the
regulation was not producing the intended effects.
Congress concluded that interest n-ateceilings created
problems for depository institutions, discriminated
against small savers, and did not increase the supply
of r’esidential mor-tgage credit. The committee estab-
lished by Congress accelerated the process ofphasing
out Regulation Q in 1982 after Congress directed it to
authorize deposit accounts that were “directly equiva-
lent to and corupetitive with money market mutual
funds.”
The steps taken to phase out Regulation Q have
altered the distribution of deposits between commer—
cial banks and thrift institutions. Before 1980, ceiling
interest rates were higher at thrift institutions on de-
posits in denominations less than $100,000. Thrifts
lost this interest rate advantage as the ceiling n’ates
wet-c lifted. The sban’e of small time and savings de-
posits at commercial banks rose from about 40 per-
cent in 1979 to over 50 percent in 1985, as commercial
banks were allowed to compete with thiift institutions
for- these deposits on equal terms. ‘l’hrift institutions
have responded by increasing their’ share of large—
denomination time deposits. The distn-ibmrtion oftotal
time and savings deposits between corumer-cial banks
and thrift institutions has been essentially unchanged
since 1982.
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APPENDIX
The Effect of Phasing Out Regulation Qon the
Distribution of Deposits between Banks and Thrifts
This appendix presents an analysis of the supply
and demand fbr deposits to illustrate the influence of
Regulation Q’s phase-out on the distribution of de-
posits between commercial banks and thrifts. It ana-
lyzes the reasons for’ the rise in the share of small-
denomination accounts at banksand the reasons why
the phase-out of the ceiling rates had such limited
effects on the distribution of total deposits between
banks and thrifts.
The major difference between figure 3, used for the
analysis in this appendix, and figure 2 is the influence
oflarge-denomination deposits on the supply curves
for deposits. At least some categories of deposits in
denominations of$100,000 or more have been exempt
from Regulation Q ceiling rates since June 1970; all
deposits in denominations of $100,000 or rnor-e have
been exempt since May 1973. To investor’s, large-de-
nomination deposits are alter-natives to commercial
paper, Treasury securities, and other money mar’ket
instruments. Banks and thrifts ar’eassumed to be price
takers in the market for large-denomination deposits.
The interest rate they must pay to attn-act these de-
posits is independent of the quantity they demand,
and banks and thrifts must pay the mar’ket rate to
attract any large-denomination deposits.
Until the steps taken to phase out Regulation Q
(table 1), deposits in denominations of less than
$100,000 were subject to ceiling rates. The supply
curves ofdeposits at banks and thrifts are designed to
r’eflect the differences in ceiling rates based on de-
nominations of deposits. As in figure 2, the supply of
small-denomination deposits at thrifts depends on
the interest r’ates that banks pay on them, wlule rhe
supply curve for banks depends on the n-ate paid by
thrifts.
Banks and thrifts are assumed to be competitive. IfFigure 3





the ceiling rates on small-denomination deposits are
above the market interest rate on large-denomination
deposits, banks and thrifts are assumed to pay small
depositors the market interest r’ate on large-denomi-
nation deposits lr,~f.If the levels of deposits they
demand, given the market interest rate on large-de-
nomination deposits, exceeds the levels of small-dc-
nomination deposits supplied at that market inten’est
r’ate, banks and thrifts obtain the additional deposits
in the niarket for’ tar-ge-denomination deposits. In
ter’ms of the symbols in figur-e 3, the total quantity of
deposits demanded by banks is B:,; they obtain B, as
small—denomination deposits arid the r’est from the
market Ion’ tar-ge-denomination deposits. The small-
denomination deposits ofthrifts are ‘I’, arid their’large-
denomination deposits are ‘I’., minus ‘t’,.
Suppose in contn’ast,that the ceiling n-ates on small—
denomination deposits are r~’rtthrifts and r~ at banks.
Imposing theceiling r’atescauses the supply curves of
small—denominalion deposits to shift to the night.
Banks can attract a given level ofsmall-denomination
deposits at a tower’ interest nate with these ceiling
rates in effect, since the ceiling r’ales limit the interest
rate on the closest substitutes for deposit accounts at
banks, which are deposit accounts at thr-ifts. i’hese
shifts in thesupply curves to the right ofSir,,,) for’hanks
and lhnilis are assumed to be proportional to the
decline in therates paid by the competing institutions
when the ceiling rates are imposed. Imposing the
ceiling rates is assumed to shift the supply curve
further to the right at thrifts, since banks are subject to
the lower ceiling rates.
Given the natur’e of the supply curves in figure 3,
imposing the ceiling rates rf~ and r~ causes the small-
denomination deposits of thrifts to rise from ‘I’, to ‘F,
and small-denomination deposits ofbanks to fallfrom
B to B,.The outcomes could be different, of course, if
the supply curves had different slopes than those
used in figure 3. These ceiling n-ates do nor affect the
total quantity of deposits demanded by banks arid
thrifts, since B:,and 13 are determined by the demand
curves for total deposits and the mar’ket intert’st r’ate
on large-denomination deposits.
Given the assumptions underlying figure 3, the
elimination of ceiling r’ates on small—denomination
deposits would cause the~,shar•e of small-denornina-
tion deposits at commer’cial banks to rise (from B,
divided by B, plus ‘I’, to B, divided by B, plus T). This
change would not affect the distribution of total de-
posits between banks and thrifts, but would cause the
pr’oportion of lan’ge—denonunation deposits at thrifts
to rise. Thus, the nature of the results derived from
figure 3 are consistent with the actual outcomes re-
corded in table 3.
Banks
Interest
rates
B
0
0
Deposits, Loans